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Abstract
On August 17, 1998, Russia defaulted on its domestic public debt, declared a moratorium on the
private banks’ foreign liabilities which was equivalent to an outright default, and abandoned its exchange
rate regime. The depth of the Russian meltdown shocked the international markets, and precipitated a period
of serious financial instability. It is important to understand the roots of such a crisis to learn about possible
lessons on both issues of bank supervision and international stability.
While the visible cause of the crisis was an unsustainable fiscal deficit coupled with massive capital
flight, the critical question concerns the origin of such circumstances. This paper argues that the structure
of individual incentives in the Russian legal context, compounded by the exceptional support granted by
international institutions to Russia, explains the cycle of nonpayment, capital flight and fiscal unbalances
leading to the dramatic 1998 crisis. We offer an interpretative model of noncompliance, cash-stripping and
rational collective nonpayment which led to the fiscal and banking crisis and ultimately to a complete
meltdown. In our view, the banking sector was already insolvent prior to the crisis, and contributed directly
and indirectly to it. The last section of the paper puts forward a radical medium-term policy proposal for a
stable banking and payment system for Russia. Russia needs to create a basic foundation for savings and
intermediation by asset restrictions and market segmentation, crude but effective rules used in all
underdeveloped systems to restrain asset stripping and opportunism. Concretely, we propose a cautious
extension of deposit insurance away from the monopolistic Sberbank and towards a narrow banking layer.
The proposal also proposes measures to restore charter value in the commercial banking sector.
I thank Jerome Sgard, Charles Wyplosz, Erik Berglof, Julian Franks, Tatiana Paramonova, Michael Fuchs,
Bill Alexander, Julia Shvets, Stijn Claessens, Marina Malyutina, and participants at presentations at the
Economic Policy Panel in October 2000 in Paris, at the EBRD,  the IMF, the London School of Economics
and ECARES. Work on this paper has been written under the auspices of my policy work at RECEP in
1997-2000, supported by the TACIS program of the European Commission.
The paper has drawn from the chronology of events in Perotti-Sgard (2000).2
Introduction
On Monday August 17, 1998, the Russian authorities unilaterally declared a moratorium on all ruble-
denominated public debt, froze for a three-month period all foreign obligations of the domestic banking
sector; this amounted to a  de facto  complete default by the government and the banking system. The ruble
rapidly lost two third of its value vis a vis the dollar (see Figure 1), while a dramatic liquidity crisis and
massive bank runs ensued.
During the following weeks the shock created by these measures developed into a full-scale international
crisis of confidence, with credit spreads widening dramatically in all markets and briefly raising doubt on
global financial stability. The shock waves were so strong because almost no one, not even among the most
skeptical observers, had anticipated such a complete, utter collapse
1 .
The scale and scope of the Russian financial collapse, not to mention its speed, has challenged observers to
seek a specific model of financial behavior for the Russian economy. This paper will argue that interpreting
the Russian crisis requires an investigation of the distorted nature of underlying microeconomic incentives
which led to such a stupefying meltdown (Graph 1).
2
It has been argued that the Russian crisis followed a conventional fiscal crisis; and that the resulting
government default and devaluation were the main causes of the banking collapse (Popov, 2000). We will
argue instead that while macroeconomic factors were the visible final causes of the collapse, the interesting
question concerns the causes of the underlying behavior which produced such imbalances and thus are the
ultimate roots of the crisis.
Essentially, this paper claims that overwhelming incentives to strip cash out of all old and new Russian
institutions (banks, private and state firms) led to a diffuse nonpayment culture, and fed a frantic flow of
capital flight throughout the reform period. The government was both unable and unwilling to control such
a process. Collective noncompliance reduced policy options dramatically; moreover, the political leadership
needed the support of special interests to remain in power, and allowed them a free rein in plundering and in
capital flight. As a water tank full of holes, Russia hemorrhaged cash faster than what could be pumped in
                                                        
1  In the end, only a firm intervention by the Fed culminating in the rescue of the overexposed LTCM hedge fund restored
confidence.
2  There are two main interpretations of financial crises. A first approach sees them as the result of irrational investors first
running up prices excessively, then fleeing en mass upon flimsy news (e.g. Radelet and Sachs, 1999); the second approach sees
them as the ultimate result of accumulated unbalances, emerging endogenously due to serious weaknesses in the underlying
legal and institutional framework, too long sustained by implicit guarantees (Krugman, 1998). We place the Russian crisis
squarely in the second category.3
by foreign government and institutions, keen to contain a communist reversal, or by foreign investors
playing a few hands at Russian roulette.
During the years of transition, Russian enterprises and banks effectively moved from soft budget constraints
to soft legal constraints. The lack of a reliable public enforcement was in part the result of the political
control inheritance of Soviet Russia,
3  when legal rules were subject to arbitrary changes and constant  ex
post  bargaining, and in part in the failure of early transition policy, which reinforced a collective attitude to
inertia. Thereafter, the settlement of obligations became a matter of private bargaining, where rules and
agreements mattered less than the relative strengths of the parties involved.
Special interests managed to capture both privatization and later stabilization policy. According to Shleifer
and Treisman (1999), allowing powerful insiders to capture large rents was a necessary political
compromise to remove resistance to reform by those which were able to block its progress. Yet in any pact
with the devil, it is unclear who sets the rules. Similarly to privatization, the supervision of banks, the
creation of the public debt market, stabilization policy, and finally the provision of currency hedges for
foreign investors, were all implemented in a compromise with a powerful banking lobby which granted
bankers major opportunities to capture resources from the state, from savers and foreign investors, without
exposing them to any binding "rules of conduct". While "buying in" insiders allowed to proceed with quick
progress of formal privatization and liberalization policy, it granted such powers to an insider managerial
class and banking elite to the point to relinquish the capacity to control the reform process.
It would be desirable to be able to offer concrete evidence of massive cash-stripping and illegal capital
flight; such data, of course, is by definition unavailable and, in the case of Russia, positively dangerous to
collect. Our strategy is to offer different elements of circumstantial evidence which together draw a
consistent picture.
An important conclusion we draw is that the foundations of the Russian financial system were long
undermined by perverse incentives, and its final insolvency fed the collapse rather than being a consequence
of it. The banking system was never a serious intermediating channel of funds to the real sector; banks
failed to provide safe and timely payment services. In contrast to the stable situation in Central Europe,
where deposits became accepted as a form of savings, in Russia (and in the CIS) the amount of cash in
circulation rose throughout the nineties from a fraction to over four times total deposits, far above Central
European values (Tang et al, 2000). Russian banks were often kept as empty boxes in which liabilities
                                                        
3  This tradition of arbitrary abuse of power pre-dates the 1917 revolution.4
accumulated and stripped cash was promptly sent abroad, whitewashing its ownership in the process. Banks
also raised foreign debt whenever possible, to further leverage the outflow. While Western institutions and
government poured over 100 billion dollars into Russia (of which around 20 billion via IMF loans),
conservative estimates of capital flight up to 1998 exceed USD 136 billion.
Yet capital flight was a rational, if perverse and corrupt, response to the institutional failure of the post-
Soviet reforms, and was exactly the specular counterpart of the nonpayment problem.
The main fact consistent with our view is that unlike more traditional crises, capital flight did not accelerate
dramatically before the collapse. Rather, capital escaped at an enormous but steady rate throughout the
nineties, and even during 1995-1997 stabilization period, a time of large trade surpluses and high real rates
(see Figure 2). This is prima facie evidence that the fiscal crisis and the resulting devaluation were the final
consequence of steady, structural outflows rather than mirroring a progressive budget deterioration. In this
paper we seek to explain the microeconomic causes of such steady outflows in terms of the failure to
establish a proper structure of legal enforcement.
Yet other transition and developing countries faced the same institutional problems that Russia faced. Why
was the crisis in Russia so sudden and so deep ?  Similar arguments, based on opportunism and crony
capitalism,  have been put forward for the Asian crisis as well.
4  In what way is Russia different from, say,
Ukraine or Bulgaria, or even Indonesia ?
Russia’s fall has been spectacular in large part because it had been artificially delayed. Its nominal reforms
were for too long supported by international financial institutions and Western countries keen to see a pro-
Western stand survive in Moscow. Western governments were generous lenders; both the 1996 and the
1998 IMF loan programs were clear examples of concessionary support, and sent powerful signals to
private investors. Most other countries are not allowed such a long run, and their failures are thus less
spectacular. In addition, in few countries were the short incentives to strip cash at all cost as strong, and the
risk of punishment as feeble, as in Russia in the late Yeltsin period, with a gross currency overvaluation and
a weak political center.
In such a context, the overwhelming focus of Western assistance on monetary stabilization, funded by
foreign aid and loans, was terribly misplaced, and suggests an inappropriate policy approach. A more
appropriate focus would have been to press for stricter contractual discipline in the new (the banks) and
                                                        
4  There the macroeconomic picture looked quite different; a large trade deficit, a much better fiscal position, large domestic
banking systems, and especially a high investment and growth rate. Yet the described massive financial misallocation (Corsetti,5
"reformed" institutions (the Central bank and the state enterprises), and to close the many "legal" avenues
for shameless appropriation as preconditions for any lending. 
5
To be fair, the IMF and the World Bank came under intense political pressure to support Russia at any
cost. They were forced to gamble, in the hope that stability would last long enough so that over time a
microeconomic basis would be built. Yet the massive support they gave to support the ruble actually
reinforced the short-term incentives to appropriate and export capital, by creating an unsustainable degree
of ruble overvaluation. 
6
This paper starts with a brief chronology of the main trends in the banking and enterprise sectors during the
period 1992-98.  It then describes the basic incentives and a model of collective moral hazard behavior of
widespread cash-stripping and insolvency, and discusses how this precipitated the inevitable crisis of
August 1998 and how it helps explain some of the surprising consequences of the crisis. The last section
discusses a radical policy proposal, based on the interpretation presented, for the medium-term restructuring
of the hollowed-out banking sector within a framework of crude but more reliable  regulatory constraints.
Section 1  A brief history of Russian  banking, 1992-1997
The emergence of a new financial system
After a period of partial and inconsistent reforms under Gorbachov, the demise of the Soviet Union in the
fall of 1991 opened the way for an ambitious “shock-therapy” program, launched in January 1992 along
lines comparable to the Polish 1990 plan. The Gaidar government tightened central bank credit in January
1992 in order to encourage microeconomic restructuring in the wake of price liberalization. The impact was
a serious credit crunch; the critical phase of this policy required consistency in resisting pressures for
reflation and compensatory bailouts, ultimately forcing adjustment. In the Russian case, the adjustment
response was insufficient, and arrears mounted at a dramatic rate. The policy collapsed by summer, when
unpaid trade bills were three times as large as total bank credit, with a massive bailout funded by money
printing. The temporary bailout  validated collective inertia and led to new cycles of arrears in 1992, 1993,
and 1994. Domestic savings were wiped out by the resulting inflation.
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Pesenti and Roubini, 1998), supported by moral hazard by foreign investors (Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini, 1999), is quite
similar.
5  The new mandate suggested for the IMF would reduce its relative novel role in promoting microeconomic reforms and limit it
to provide short term liquidity to countries satisfying certain criteria. Its likely effect would be to severely limit the number of
countries which would qualify for IMF support, and increase pressure to perform legal and institutional reform as a pre-
condition for intervention as opposed to loan conditionality .6
A cycle of tightening central bank credit, lack of adjustment leading to illiquidity, an explosion in trade and
wage (and increasingly tax) arrears, output disruption, and finally reflationary money injections, led to high
inflation over the period 1992-1994, with monthly inflation rate between 5 and 25%.
What explain the failure of this early stabilization attempt? We believe that it was the result of the choice
made by  a critical mass of enterprises  facing a tough restructuring decision. In deciding whether to
restructure or not, each  manager had to take  into account his adjustment costs as well as the chance of  a
bailout of insolvent units.  This latter depended critically on the expected number of inertial responses, as a
critical mass of insolvent firms creates an insurmountable political pressure for relief (Perotti, 1998). Thus
the individual decision depends on the decision of others, as well as on the credibility of the government.
Since this systemic policy shift implies a collective response with strategic complementarity, multiple
equilibria were possible: the degree of ex post enforcement of financial obligations was endogenous to the
collective compliance response by others. Russian expectations about the likely behavior of other units (in
part a function of cultural and historical experience,
7   as well as a rational assessment of median adjustment
costs) clearly suggested a deep lack of confidence in the capacity of the system to sustain the changes
required by the tight credit policy.
8
The cyclical bailout policy extinguished itself at the point when the real size of each bailout declined over
time, in part due to more rapid inflation surges.
A new financial sector developed under the laissez-faire entry policy which started in 1989, when capital
requirements for a banking license were ridiculously low, while monitoring and supervision were at best
formal. The number of Russian banks went from fewer than 10 to over 2500 in the early 1990s. Many
banks simply performed cash management, capital flight and whitewashing services for enterprises or
shadowy organizations (pocket banks), and were at first active mostly in speculating against the ruble. At a
time of high inflation, banks could also hold on to transfer payments for clients while earning the float,
which corresponds to the private collection of a large inflation tax. Non-bank institutions developed rapidly
into pure Ponzi schemes, such as the large MMM scheme which collapsed in 1994. Some well-connected
banks richly benefited from political support, with profitable assignments to manage the balances of State
authorities, or to finance certain expenditures.
                                                                                                                                                                                        
6  The visible weakness and incompetence of the externally supported government also reinforced domestic concerns for future
political upheaval.
7  Passive resistance was a pattern already developed under central planning, when unrealistic diktats from the center could be
often resisted by collective sluggishness.7
Stabilization policy from 1995 onward froze the printing presses; at that point there was a last chance to
tighten financial discipline. In contrast, a weak government, prey of special interests, only shifted to a
different form of ex post laxity; it did not manifest itself in looser money, but looser rules, condoning
nonpayment and theft and stoking trouble for later.
From 1995 onwards, the number of banks fell under the regulatory tightening of Mrs. Paramonova’s more
rigorous policy at the CBR. The more obvious short-term players went under with the progress of
disinflation, which she pursued rigorously. It was probably at this critical stage that the last chance for
financial discipline was lost to the pressure of special interest. After the removal of Paramonova by the
Duma in 1996, supervisory reform de facto stopped, and returned to formalistic controls. Capital increases
required by regulation were achieved via accounting tricks, such as using funds borrowed from the bank
itself.
While banks were allowed to operate insolvent, under either an ineffectual, or incompetent, or  co-opted
Central Bank, they were hardly alone. Once stabilization policy put a stop to the destruction of real
obligations via inflation, enterprises rapidly ran up large amounts of trade and wage arrears (see Figures 3
and 4); tax payments, largely raised from enterprises, went massively overdue; citizens did not pay utilities;
even the government itself  failed to pay for pensions and purchases.
In 1997 the economic growth rate was marginally positive for the first time in the 90s, thanks to falling
interest rates on the back of strong Western financial inflows. Nominal stabilization was obtained by
shifting from inflationary financing to issuing ruble-denominated public bonds (at first just to a few Russian
banks at extremely high yields, and later to foreign institutions. In 1997 the economic growth rate was
marginally positive for the first time in the 90s, thanks to falling interest rates on the back of strong Western
financial inflows. Thanks to foreign exchange stabilization, intermediated ruble assets for the first time
offered better returns than mattress dollars. This made possible the build-up of a small deposit base by a
limited number of private banks, competing with the former retail monopoly Sberbank, the sole bank
enjoying deposit insurance. In 1997 there were brief signs of some growth in intermediation to enterprises,
although most lending was extended either within bank-controlled groups or along personal relationships.
The stock market boomed, as foreign brokers interpreted the low price-to-earning ratio of Russian stocks as
a buying opportunity, rather than a reflection of the non-existent protection of minority rights.
                                                                                                                                                                                        
8   Countries in Central Europe with a historical memory of individual responsibility under a classic rule of law have done better8
This superficial impression of a window of opportunity was actually doomed to fade rapidly. Russian firms
kept avoiding tax, wage and loan payments, even when able to perform them. Capital flight
Under the pressure of increasing budget deficits caused by tax arrears and a weak oil price, investment in
the GKO-OFZ government bond market, initially reserved to a small group of insider banks, was opened to
foreign investors. These bonds paid very high rates in real terms as inflation fell, which further encouraged
cash stripping and tax arrears. Capital flight of stolen cash, on the other hand, did not diminish. Banks took
advantage of stabilization and the IMF support to accumulate dollar liabilities to fund their GKO
purchases; their net profit from the interest rate differential were quickly exported. Yet banks kept reporting
a strong balance sheet.
The final example of private capture of regulation, which in the end worsened dramatically the crisis, was
the transfer of the provision of forward contracts on the forex exchange in January 1998 from the Central
bank to the commercial banking sector, arguing that dollar hedges were necessary to retain international
investors in Russia. Russian banks rushed to offer forward contracts to foreigners eager to hedge their ruble
risk on a massive scale, capturing the interest rate differential with no investment at all while the exchange
rate held, while at the same time offering insurance they had no plan to honor.
The difficulty in refinancing the booming stock of short term public debt was compounded by the Asian
crisis in late 1997. A new Russian government was brought in March 1998, on a mandate to restore fiscal
responsibility. As it turned out, its few reforms went unimplemented, tax collection did not improve, banks
were emptied, and capital kept flowing steadily abroad. 
9  As it turned out, its few reforms went
unimplemented, tax collection did not improve, banks were emptied, and capital kept flowing steadily
abroad. Yet even the average Russian turned out to be a bit naïve; Perotti and Sgard (2000) argued that
Russian bond markets had envisioned a devaluation, not a complete default. Only a few influential Russian
bankers managed to capture and abscond the last rounds of dollar reserves from the Central Banks just
before the collapse.
10  At that stage they managed to convince the government to announce as well a 90-day
foreign debt moratorium on all loans and currency forward contracts as part of the maneuver, allowing them
a de facto right to default for the time necessary to remove the last assets left within the banks.
                                                                                                                                                                                        
in reversing collective inertia or collusion than countries with a longer tradition of central planning.
9  Yet even the average Russian turned out to be a bit naïve; Perotti and Sgard (2000) argued that Russian bond markets had
envisioned a devaluation, not a complete default. Only a few influential Russian bankers managed to capture and abscond the
last rounds of dollar reserves from the Central Banks just before the collapse.
10  Mr. Potanin, the owner of the major private bank Uneximbank, revealed in  November 1998 that some bankers knew a few
days in advance about the free floating of the ruble on August 17
th .9
Section 2 The players of the cash-stripping economy
We review more in details the incentives and forms of cash-stripping in the privatized enterprises; we then
discuss the general consequences on demonetization and on the fiscal budget. At the end we then discuss the
critical role played by the banks.
Enterprises
Mass privatization created private firms controlled by insiders. In a grand political bargain to buy out
opposition to privatization (Shleifer, 1992), ownership of most enterprises became controlled by insiders,
with managers in firm control (often thanks to share purchases or pooling of shareholdings from workers
under the control of managers).
One consequence of poor legal enforcement is that control rights are much more valuable than contractual
and property rights (Modigliani and Perotti, 1998; Bebchuk, 1999). Control generates access to cash-
appropriating activities and thus to the purchase of political support, which is essential for protection from
enforcement or to buy favorable legislation. In the end, it is not lack of legal text, but capacity or
willingness to enforce, which makes all the difference (Gelfer, Pistor and Raiser, 2000).
Whether these entities would establish themselves as long-term institutions depended on whether there
existed incentives to restructure, by retaining cash flow and reinvesting it internally.
11  This did not happen
in Russia: owner-managers of all types of institutions (whether firms or banks) had poor incentives to
restructure their productive activities and reinvest internally.
Why were economic incentives so distorted for enterprise management ? Restructuring production offered
low returns and high risk, due to the fall in demand, the novelty of a competitive market, and direct threats
to property rights. Corporate profits were exposed to external predation, either by the tax administration,
criminals and racketeers, unpaid clients or workers, or even the Communists in the Duma. In this
environment managers protected their own interests against predation by stripping and transferring cash,
rather than investing it in value-adding activities. As the Romans said, "Pecunia non olet": cash has no odor.
Cash is anonymous, easy to transfer, and difficult to track and tax. 
12  The discretionary power to swap
                                                        
11  In all countries the real sector relies on internal finance as the primary source for re-investment and capital accumulation; this
is particularly true in developing countries.
12   This problem was made more acute by a legal framework in which someone who acquires illegally obtained property in a
formally correct procedure is recognized as the owner. Thus asset-stripping needs only one intermediate step to legalize the
transaction.10
assets at arbitrary prices, produced greater cash flow than what managers could hope to gain as value-
optimizing shareholders.
13
Why did privatization fail to break this pattern? First, it granted insiders control but fuzzy property rights.
Second, it left no external threat to the manager in the case of failure. This created extreme incentives for
the opportunistic appropriation of cash-flow rather than medium-term restructuring. Yet privatization has
produced better results in other countries with weak incentives, such as in the Czech Republic. The Russian
case suggests a loss of regulatory control over the process, in part due to the excessive capture of power by
the insiders.
The most spectacular example of the ability of insiders to capture control of large rents in exchange for
political support was the debt-for-share deal, negotiated at a time when the main bankers sat in the
government. Via an obscure secured loan, control of the best industrial and natural resource companies was
captured by a few influential banks in 1994, creating a number of Financial Industrial Groups (FIGs) .
14
The nonpayment culture and the de facto seniority of claims
In an environment where cash money is hoarded and where the settlement of debts and contracts is mostly a
function of bargaining, a sort of  de facto  seniority of claims emerge which has little connection with the de
jure contractual seniority.
In the actual seniority of claims in Russia, what counts is first the capacity to impose powerful sanctions,
often greater for criminals over legal entities, or local government over federal government. Next comes the
implicit power derived from reciprocal dependence, such as links to trading or financial partners, or political
allies. Foreign investors belong to this category only as long as they may offer new funding in the future.
Next comes the formal authority of government.
The  de facto  most junior creditors, with the least bargaining power, are expectedly the workers’ retail
depositors and minority shareholders. Wage payments do not rank high among the priorities of Russian
managers; their capacity to run up wage arrears is in fact crucial to understanding how the Russian
                                                        
13  Selling out loss-making enterprises to external investors was also hardly profitable, given the difficulty of seizing control
against other insiders. There have been several episodes in which workers and managers successfully resisted raids by armed
Interior Ministry troops to seize industrial premises on behalf of external investors.
14  Large industrial-financial groups, common in underdeveloped financial systems, certainly owe their influence to political
support. yet they may provide governance and an internal capital market to alleviate credit constraints. Empirical research on
Russian FIGs (Perotti and Gelfer, 2001) has shown that while group firms were better managed, cash flow from cash rich group
firms was reallocated on a massive scale, and may have been shifted outside the group.11
economy could maintain a tight monetary policy in the face of massive insolvency. Unlike, say, Latin
America, it was possible for both the government and enterprises to ignore legitimate payments to workers,
savers, and pensioners at the time of tight money. In no other industrialized country have workers suffered
such a degree of nonpayment with such resignation (Earle, 1998). The diffuse cynicism of Russian citizens,
and their mistrust of authorities and reform, cannot come as a surprise.
Taxation
Liabilities to tax authorities in Russia have enjoyed a variable status, contingent on political circumstances.
While payments to central tax authorities depend on the perceived political strength of the government,
payments to local government were usually more binding.  As for other liabilities, the ability to resist tax
payments depended on the size of the enterprise and its political strength, especially for firms with strong
local presence or for nation-wide players, such as Gazprom and the large electricity networks.
Uncontrolled opportunistic behavior can have systemic effects, when moral hazard is reinforced by its
diffusion; it can then undermine general contractual discipline, overwhelm legal enforcement, and lead to a
complete loss of control over taxation.
The sketch of a model of collusive behavior can illustrate this point. Consider the incentive of a Russian
firm to delay payment of its tax liabilities. There may be some costs due to the risk of strong enforcement
measures. This risk is likely to diminish as more firms fall in arrears, as tax authorities face a greater task
of collection, and perhaps more political resistance. (While there are penalties for late tax payment, in
theory quite stiff, final settlement in Russia is almost always a matter of bargaining.)
As in the case of financial stabilization, the perceived risk of noncompliance depends on the perception of
what other firms are doing. At the same time, the reward of delaying payment was represented by either the
prospect of capital flight or by the yield on GKOs. This further reinforces the benefits of tax resistance: the
lower the tax revenues, the larger the budget gap, the stronger the need to issue bonds, and the higher the
GKO yield. Thus, under expectations of widespread tax resistance, the costs of delay fall and its rewards
rise in the perceived number of firms in tax arrears.
15
In fact, tax revenues as a percentage of GNP continued to remain weak throughout the period (Figure 5).
The last days of the failing Chermomyrdin administration were marked by a massive expansion in tax
surrogates (offset payments, e.g. unpaid deliveries to regional government), allowing enterprises to erase
                                                        
15  All this suggests that resolving the problem of massive tax evasion and capital flight requires in Russia a strong central
political leadership in place. This seems confirmed by the improved discipline under the Putin administration.12
overdue taxes, and were matched by rising GKO rates. Even as the new government of Kirilenko tightened
fiscal rules, and closed the legal loopholes of tax offsets, payments in cash kept stagnating, reflecting the
impotence and the political weakness of the government (Ivanova and Wyplosz, 1999).
The collusive model applies equally naturally to compliance to legal reform or to enforcement of prudential
rules in the banking sector. Massive non compliance overwhelms any (if any) ability of policy-makers to
address it ex post. Just as monetary authorities come under extreme pressure for financial relief, and tax
authorities fail to enforce payments, thus validating nonpayment, legal reform cannot be enforced in the face
of collective noncompliance. The result is to induce either an explicit financial bailout or a legal bailout with
massive socialization of losses.  This effect, termed by Janet Mitchell (1998) the "too-many-to-fail  effect»,
has been modeled by Perotti (1998) in the context of financial arrears, by Roland and Verdier (1994) for
privatization, and by Mitchell (1993) for bankruptcy.
In a situation of no societal constraints to the abuse of power, the question is: what is the response of
powerless citizens and firms ? The rational response in Russia has been collective inertia and passive
resistance on a massive scale. An unreliable legal environment and collective inertia reinforce each other. In
terms of financial behavior, asset-stripping at the top is matched by the passivity and systemic non-payment
and illegality.
The inability of the federal government to enforce fiscal discipline, including local government, and its
failure to pay suppliers, contributed massively to the growth of barter. The state was forced to accept tax
payments in kind; “offset operations”, where overpriced deliveries to local government were accepted as
fiscal payments, weakened fiscal credibility (see Ivanova and Wyplosz, 2001).
  16
The ability to ignore payments to suppliers depends on their importance and size. Russian firms need to
maintain good relations in order to secure essential inputs; yet such is the value of cash that their preferred
form of payment has been via barter transactions, leading to an unprecedented degree of demonetization of
payments.
Similar experiences have historically occurred in a war or hyperinflationary conditions. In contrast, barter
grew steadily as inflation fell in 1994-1998
17 . Figure 6 illustrates its dynamics, with a sharp acceleration in
coincidence with monetary stabilization: from 20% in 1995 it rose to two-third of trade during the first half
                                                        
16  Political changes which are widely seen as weakening the center can thus have a disproportionate effect on tax compliance if
they become a focal point for expectations of a weaker bargaining position by the federal government.
17  While there is no consensus on the causes, some facts are clear. It is associated with large, privatized firms; it is more
diffused in agriculture and industry, especially energy utilities, than in services; strong real good competition tends to be linked
with less barter.13
of 1998, in tandem with tax and wage arrears. It is, jointly with the explosion in cash holdings, further
evidence that cash-stripping took precedence on productive activity. Evidence to this effect is that barter
rose with real interest rates and with ruble overvaluation, the opportunity cost of timely payment (Figure 7).
18
A related view is that barter is a form of collateralized trade credit, which emerges when there is no credible
liquidation threat for insolvent firms. Marin and Schnitzer (1999, 2000) argue that barter supports trade
between tightly integrated firms, when credit enforcement is unreliable. Thanks to mutual bargaining power,
trading via barter goods provides a form of collateral which limits the buyer's ability to resist payment. In
terms of our argument, barter offers the sole transacting solution when managers have overwhelming
incentives to strip any cash.
Demonetization extended to retail payments and even cash savings, with estimates of dollar cash holdings
ranging from equal to thrice ruble holdings. The structural delay in payment transfers by banks and their
general unreliability contributed specifically to this phenomenon.
We now come to discuss the role of banks.
Banks and Banking Supervision
Bankers retained only a tiny personal claim on assets, but held discretionary control over their allocation.
Connected lending (namely, loans to insiders and friends) was often an outright transfer; the cash would be
lent to an empty box firm which would pass it on and ultimately vanish, leaving no trace of its owners. Cash
also left the banks via purchases at face value of worthless securities from obscure companies, often located
abroad. Box 1 shows an example of such transactions, drawn from an actual case.
                                                        
18  Ivanova and Wyplosz (1999) find that both higher monetary growth and higher interest rates are correlated with higher barter.14
Box 1: An anedoctal account of cash stripping
The following is an account of a common technique to strip funds used by large Moscow banks around the
August crisis.
1.  There exists a fairly liquid market for the promissory notes issued by some obscure organizations. They
trade at 0.15% of their nominal value. Most popular were the notes issued by some Federal Energy
Systems. It was obscurely alleged that these notes were guaranteed by the RAO United Energy Systems
of Russia. The market capitalization in nominal terms of these notes exceeds the annual Russian GNP.
2.  An offshore company XXX buys these notes at the market price and then puts them on its balance at
the nominal valuation. A Russian company would have to value them at the historical cost (i.e. at the
market value).
3.  The Russian Bank ZZZ and XXX write a Contract of Exchange in which ZZZ issues promissory notes
secured by some real assets. These are exchanged for the "funny" notes owned by XXX. The upshot is
that the rate of exchange corresponds to the face value of the "funny" notes. A Contract of Exchange
also avoid tax liabilities.
4.  Optional. A new Russian bank YYY is set up. It is owned by the owners of ZZZ but not related to ZZZ
in any formal way. YYY issues its unsecured promissory notes and exchanges them for the secured
notes of ZZZ in possession of the offshore company XXX.
5.  The offshore company XXX is liquidated.
6.  Conclusion: the old bank ZZZ is left with all the liabilities and with promissory notes valued at their
face value but in essence worthless. The newly created bank YYY is free of liabilities and has all the
real assets.15
On paper, the Russian Central Bank progressively adopted Western supervisory standards. On paper,
Russian banks were highly capitalized in 1997-98. In practice, the tighter supervisory policy of bank
closures was abandoned once Mrs. Paramonova was removed from her position as Governor by the Duma,
presumably under pressure from the banking lobby. The Central Bank has been a fictional regulator since
then.
Bankers have enjoyed tremendous political clout, either via their cash-rich lobbying or by virtue of their
control over the media. One example of their political power is reflected in the incredible story of Russian
bankruptcy law. The first general bankruptcy law in 1990 was extremely pro-debtor and thus toothless.
Later legislation amended the text, although the capacity to implement the law remained minimal: removing
insiders from control turned out to be almost impossible
19 . Furthermore, under intense lobbying from the
cash-rich banker lobby, the law explicitly stated that it would not be applied to banks; a  new  federal
regulation would apply to this sector. Curiously, no such federal law on bank bankruptcy was ever passed
until the 1998 crisis. Since the original law ruled out any clear authority of the CBR, the result is that the
most indebted and vulnerable sector in the Russian economy could thrive in the absence of any serious
threat of exit. De jure, Russian banks could not go bankrupt. 
20
It is not surprising that most banks were kept as legal shells full of liabilities rather than built up as credit
institutions. Increasingly, as the eventual collapse was nearing, banks sought to maximize their leverage and
exposure to the foreign exchange; the cash flow generated by such speculation was taken out while
liabilities (contingent on ruble devaluation) piled up. Yet as of early 1998, Russian banks were reporting
capitalization rate above 10 % of assets, the modern equivalent of the façades of the houses in the famous
Potemkin village.
Paradoxically, the crisis has produced a negative impact on the degree of prudential enforcement and bank
closures. As evidence, Table 1 illustrates the rate of bank closures before and after the crisis. The number
of liquidated banks has fallen, just as their insolvent status has become obvious. The initial explanation that
the sheer number of failed banks overwhelmed the CBR does not hold any longer. The few CBR officers
who tried to force liquidation have been countermanded and resigned. Failed bankers are allowed to escape
repayment and even liquidation, with no legal consequences. Most incredibly, some extraordinarily
bankrupt banks whose license had been withdrawn around the time of the crisis have managed to have it
returned.
                                                        
19  In more recent days, a tighter insolvency legislation has been used by local politicians to capture control over enterprises.
20  The consequences were visible after the crisis, when some feeble attempts by the CBR to seize control of failed banks were
thrown out in court. Legislation was only passed in 1999 under intense IMF pressure, yet hardly any bank has been closed since.16
What we consider the main direct evidence of the role of the banking system and its insolvent status even
before the crisis comes from a major bank audit performed in the fall of 1998 by Western experts in the 18
most insolvent large Russian banks. Poor lending, often to strip assets in favor of connected parties,
accounted for over a third of capital losses. (Loan losses, hidden for years, more than quadrupled to 42% of
all loans in 1998, and estimates run as high as 70%). The fall in the ruble caused another 25 % of losses;
yet this reflected the banks’ extreme speculative exposure to the exchange rate, built up deliberately before
the crisis. In comparison, losses due to the fiscal default were moderate. In fact, the default on GKOs
accounted for less than 13% of losses.
This is hard at first to square with the balance sheet data on the exposure of Russian banks, which indicates
a much larger stock of GKO debt relative to their net exposure to foreign obligations until a few months
before the crisis (see  Figure 8).   The truth is that the banks' exposure to the dollar rate was much higher,
and more leveraged, by the steady sale of forward dollar contracts to foreigners in the year before the crisis,
building up a huge exposure to contingent (i.e. off-balance sheet) dollar liabilities. Table 2 illustrates the
shocking forward exchange exposure that the largest Russian banks were able to build, representing up to
twenty times their own (largely imaginary) capital. This allowed them to capture the large interest rate
differential without any real investment nor any obligation they planned to honor. The Central Bank did not
attempt any prudential control: banks were able to claim that they had "cross-hedged" their exposure by side
contracts with small regional banks.  D e facto , the difference between the net and gross exposure was
blurred.
Thus Russian banks were bankrupt even before the crisis; they were pure legal fictions used as conducts of
capital flight, leveraging their speculation bets with borrowed funds.
2.3 After the crisis
After the crisis, massive bank runs broke out. Unsurprisingly, banks were able to refuse or delay
withdrawals. While the last assets, such as office furniture, left the bank buildings, the Central Bank shifted
most frozen deposit to the old Soviet savings bank Sberbank. Depositor confidence in private banks has
collapsed, and Sberbank has been able to absorb 90% of the ruble savings market. No other bank but
Sberbank, a clumsy and inefficient retail operation, enjoy deposit insurance.
The crisis in Russia did not have the same impact on real activity as in Mexico in 1995 and in Asia in 1997.
A steep fall in production occurred immediately after the August crisis, reflecting severe disruptions in
domestic trade; but a strong recovery surfaced by December and the output loss was comparatively modest.
Many authors have argued that severe recessions in emerging economies are linked to financial distress and17
sharp liquidity crunches, possibly aggravated by adverse policy initiatives (see Stiglitz, Sachs, Ferri and
Kang 1999, Borensztein and Lee 2000). In Russia, the ability of firms and banks to renege on their
obligations, the limited development of intermediation, and the extend of barter trade contribute to explain
why the financial crisis did not feed through in the real economy.
Three important elements have changed in Russia since the crisis.  As the ruble overvaluation has
disappeared and domestic demand has revived, the trade-off between cash-stripping and productive activity
has shifted; as a result, firms have started using more conventional trade credit or even cash payments,
capital flight has slowed.  As a result of political consolidation under Putin, central (tax) authority has been
partially restored, rising additional risks for capital flight and outright tax default. Finally, a strong oil price
has boosted corporate liquidity and thus demand.
As a result of changed incentives, capital flight of export revenues has slowed down (as Figure 2
illustrates). This is remarkable in the light of the massive increase in (pre-stripped) enterprise liquidity.
Clearly, the pressure to escape the ruble has subsided as the currency overvaluation has diminished; and the
new political leadership has been both reassuring and conducive to greater discipline.
Further evidence that barter is associated with incentives for cash-stripping out of the enterprise sector
comes from its steady fall since the crisis.
Yet capital flight persists, and the country's financial system has lost all financial credibility abroad and
internally; preciously little has occurred to restart the domestic intermediation circuit. In fact, banking
policy does not even appear in the list of policy initiatives undertaken in Russia under the new Putin
Administration. Some Russian financial institutions may be enjoying a return of enterprise liquidity, but the
system remains unreformed and extremely prone to the next crisis.
Section 3  A m edium term strategy for bank restructuring
Since the August crisis, individual depositors shifted away from private commercial banks to cash or
accounts at Sberbank, either by choice or by decree. This has meant the virtual implosion of the Russian
banking system towards its predecessor – the Soviet-style retail monopoly. Sberbank now accounts for over
87% of all household ruble deposits and almost 80 % of total retail deposits (Figure 9). Such extreme
concentration, induced by a deposit guarantee, discourages competition and creates a dangerous financial
and political time bomb, especially since Sberbank is now venturing into commercial lending and shows
willingness to support politically favored projects. The fear is that the new government, keen to centralize
control, may choose to accept once again Sberbank as the transmission-belt of central orders.18
The Russian banking system has lost almost all credibility; yet restarting domestic intermediation is
indispensable to fund restructuring and essential government spending. Even though the amount of Russian
savings in the intermediation process has never been large, this is still a significant loss for the economy
given the scarcity of external funds currently available to Russia in the foreseeable future.
This section outlines a rather radical solution based on our interpretation of the economic incentives and
lack of legal enforcement in Russia.
The serious failure of supervision over Russian banks reflects in part the limited intervention capacity in the
face of the "universal bank" choice of legislation; an excessive number of licensed "banks"; shortcomings in
banking legislation, due largely to the influence of the banking lobby over legislators; poor legal
enforcement and the corruptibility of courts; and finally the lack of transparent Russian accounting
standards. The large number of commercial banks not only overrated the CBR's supervisory capacity (and
thus reduced the incentives for compliance), but also spread banking talent thin and reduced lending
margins to proper borrowers. This encouraged banks to get involved in speculation rather than in traditional
lending activities.
Very little has been done on banking policy since the crisis. The number of bank licenses withdrawn has
been considerably lower since the crisis than before.
Some legislative steps have been taken under IMF pressure since the crisis, but their enforcement has been
erratic at best. There have been cases of "zombie banks" re-obtaining a bank license via court decisions,
after two years in bankruptcy proceedings and without any new capital or restructuring plan.
In addition to the legal vacuum described above, incentives to conduct proper banking business remain
undermined by poor creditor rights protection. Under this system, loans in Russia are so risky that they
often reflect de facto transfers to insiders, which is in fact hat most of them are. There are signs of some
recovery of lending from an extremely low basis, reflecting the high liquidity in the banking sector and the
improved incentives within enterprises since the devaluation and the recent surge in oil prices, little has
changed to incentives, and the vulnerability of the sector to external shocks remains extreme. The large
number of commercial banks not only overwhelms the CBR's supervisory capacity, but also spread banking
talent thin and reduced lending margins to proper borrowers. All these factors encourage banks to engage in
speculation rather than in traditional lending activities.19
Since the crisis, very little has been done on re-establishing discipline or enforcing bankruptcy of the
remaining empty shells. Actually, the number of bank licenses withdrawn has been considerably lower since
the crisis than before (Table 1). While legislative steps have been taken under IMF pressure since the crisis,
their enforcement has been erratic at best. There have been cases of "zombie banks" re-obtaining a bank
license via court decisions, after two years in bankruptcy proceedings and without any new capital or
restructuring plan. The legal and prudential rules are easily circumvented or challenged. Since legislation
and prudential supervision have failed to control asset-stripping in banks, only radical changes in the
structure of the bankers' incentives for prudent lending will offer some chance of stability. Our proposal
seeks therefore regulatory solutions which may be crude enough to be feasible, and robust with respect to
opportunistic behavior. Yet for them to be actually enforced, they may need to relay once again on the
creation of a strong political support by special interests. We argue that this may be necessary to gain
support for their implementation, but we remain aware of the issue of the risk of their capture. In the
specific proposal outlined, the cost would be a segmented and concentrated banking system, a structure, to
be fair, which corresponds to the historical configuration of Western financial systems at the beginning of
their development.
What can be done? (Chto delat'?)
Measures to restructure Russia's banking sector will only be successful if they take into account the
problems which led to its failure. Thus, the first and foremost task of the restructuring process should be to
create incentives for prudent and efficient banking among existing and potential bank owners which would
persist into the future. One of the first priorities must be to recreate a foundation for the financial system,
by establishing a layer of reliable banking institutions to ensure payment services and safekeeping for retail
depositors.
Yet this requires also the containment of the ability of any large bank to obtain credit because of their
position in the payment system and their deposit network. The legally-determined monopoly of Sberbank
should be progressively diluted by additional entry of saving banks.
More specifically, the proposal is to differentiate strongly between savings and commercial banking,
creating a layer of banks whose main activity would be to accept deposits and conduct payments. In order
to prevent decapitalization, reckless speculation or outright cash- stripping, they will be forced to invest
their balance sheet into safe assets, such as Central Bank bonds, government bonds, domestic bonds with an20
international rating, and safe foreign assets. Riskier lending would be allowed only up to the level of paid-in
capital. The assets of such safe banks could not be legally swapped or pledged as collateral to third parties,
to rule out asset-stripping. (In the extreme case, the assets may even be deposited with the CBR.) Safe
banks may be progressively authorized to use a rising fraction of their funds to make loans or invest in real
estate, so as not to exceed their capital or a low fraction of their assets. Initially, this fraction should in any
case be no more than 10%.
These draconian quantity rules would eliminate the risk of a bank getting involved in speculative operations
or in opportunistic transactions in favor of connected parties. The supervision task of the Central Bank with
respect to these institutions should be greatly simplified, since it is much easier to monitor a bank's
compliance with asset restrictions than, for instance, its compliance with capitalization requirements.
Glaeser and Shleifer (2001) have indicated how in circumstances when regulatory enforcement is difficult,
quantity restrictions, while inefficient, may be preferred to other restrictions, easier to circumvent.
It is important to view this decision in the history of credit market development in the West. Most countries
started their financial development with a highly segmented banking system, with specialized institutions
dedicated to specific services and product. This reduced competition at the time when it was hard to control
speculation, built up specialized skills and controlled risk-shifting via asset substitutions, via strict
guidelines on admissible holdings for banks. Deregulation took place progressively, as a more indirect
regulatory framework and market mechanisms became strong enough. Russia's leap into universal banking
was not the result of a well thought out policy, rather a bending to strong special interests.
Russia must and can evolve gradually to stages of greater financial development, but the process require
some sequencing.
Narrow banks can still be profitable, despite the seemingly simple nature of activities such as handling
deposits and payments. A recent study of credit institutions in the United States, known for strong
competition among its retail banks, has shown that profits received by banks from fees for handling
payments, keeping deposits and other client services account for over 40% of the total profit of these
banks.
21  A profitability study of banks in Eastern Europe (Fries et al., 1998) also showed that a major
determinant of profitability for credit institutions in the region has been a solid retail base, which has
allowed the banks to invest depositor funds into higher yielding government paper.
In general, Russia cannot afford a universal insurance scheme, but a partial and tightly regulated insurance
scheme would be credible and help revive confidence in the system. The asset restriction of safe banks will
control the risk of reckless speculation, and would allow the state to extend a credible deposit guarantee to21
other retail banks besides Sberbank. This is desirable, in order to contain the ability of any large bank to
demand support because of its position in the payment system and their deposit network. Thus, the legally-
determined monopoly of Sberbank should be progressively diluted by additional entry of saving banks.
The second layer of banks, the commercial banks, will not have restrictions on their assets, and will not
enjoy deposit insurance. Banks in this risky layer will need to be re-licensed by the CBR to carry the name
of "bank". This licensing (or re-licensing) will be conditional on significant new capital, to be set at a fairly
high level so as to be initially very restrictive on entry.
The goal of a temporarily concentrated commercial banking sector is to restore profitability in proper
banking operations with the few available borrowers in good standing. Research suggests that a more
concentrated commercial banking sector may be safer precisely because a not excessive degree of
competition maintains margins in less risky lending. This creates powerful incentives for banks to remain
solvent in order to maintain their valuable operating licenses.
22
Segmentation and restricted entry have been the common initial structure for the banking sectors in
practically all countries at the early stage of their financial development. We believe such restrictions on
competition reflect several essential reasons. The first is that initially the institutional capacity for
contractual enforcement is limited, so constraints need to be crude to be easily verifiable and enforced. The
second is that in these circumstances the value of a banking charter is the best incentive for the development
of a medium term strategy of proper banking practices over short-term opportunistic speculation and theft.
In the long run, when the supervisory capacity of the Central Bank is significantly strengthened and the
threat of bank bankruptcy for failure to repay creditors becomes credible, the asset restriction in the safe
layer of banks can gradually be relaxed. It will also become possible to expand the flow of resources from
safe to commercial banks by allowing more interbank loans, a channel now moribund but potentially very
important. Monitoring these flows on the interbank market will become a controllable instrument of
supervision for the CBR.
There is an important political economy argument in favor of establishing an initially restrictive licensing
and re-licensing policy. As it is often the case in Russia, any reform affects strong entrenched interests
which have the ability to block it. Currently, a large number of licensed banks is little more than a burned-
out shell; yet resistance to a clean-up has discouraged even the reinvigorated Putin government. Offering to
a selected group of Russian bankers the perspective of conducting profitable business in a temporarily
concentrated market, can help overcome resistance; similarly, a policy of favoring solvent banks in
                                                                                                                                                                                        
21 L. Radecki, "Banks' Payment Driven Revenues",  Economic Policy Review , Vol. 5 no. 2, Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
1999
22  Perotti and Suarez (1999); Caminal and Matutes (1997); Hellman Murdock and Stiglitz (1998)22
takeovers of banks in trouble, may support tighter enforcement. As in all such "grand schemes" in Russia,
however, the key is that the rules of this game need to be guarded by a responsible central government
rather than being privatized.
An additional advantage of the proposed system is that it would help create a stable base for financing the
government deficit, without relying again on arrears and monetization. The use of the deposit base would
reduce the reliance of state funding on speculative institutions and inflows of short-term capital from
abroad. The experience of Latin America suggests that it is even possible to reverse capital flight once
stability is established in the government debt market, and that this policy has to start with domestically held
(but currently not intermediated) savings. Russia needs to start precisely at this point.
Once interest rates decline as a result of domestic debt stabilization, and significant improvements are
achieved in the protection of creditor rights, lending to the real sector can commence on a large scale
without jeopardizing the safety of the funds deposited. Any earlier attempt is doomed to failure.
Our proposal relies on solvency of the government debt. Clearly, an efficient banking sector can only be
created in an environment of fiscal stabilization. At the same time, the narrow banking proposal offers an
important avenue for creating a safer domestic government bond market which would lead towards greater
fiscal stability.
Conclusions
This paper has attempted to describe the hidden dynamics of the Russian banking crisis, , and to offer a
minimalist restructuring strategy based on a deeply cynical reading of the current Russian context. It has
outlined the institutional structure which produced extreme incentives to strip and export cash, leaving the
banking sector in shatters.  Our conclusion is that while success for Central European businessmen reflected
their capacity to strive in open competition, in Russia it has been the result of their capacity to capture
resources flowing out of the State or to seize oligopolistic or protectionist rents (see also Johnson,
Macmillan and Woodruff, 1998).
How can we compare this response to the case of other transition countries where stabilization succeeded,
such as in Central Europe ? Clearly, the level and distribution of restructuring costs in the economy matters
for the individual decisions as well as for the collective outcome. The existence of a sufficiently strong pre-
socialism legal tradition may have helped other countries to build credibility around the new legal and
regulatory framework. In the end, enforcement is in fact endogenous; only when enough citizens choose to23
obey the law, it becomes possible to enforce it on the few who do not comply. Figure 10 confirms the
relative standing of Russia and other FSU countries in terms of institutional capacity for legal enforcement.
Other reasons should be sought in the perceived ability of the political system to commit to continued
reforms and strengthening of the rule of law.
 Possibly the single most important factor determining
commitment ability was the prospect of joining the European Union, an objective shared by the
overwhelming majority of the population in most Central and Eastern European countries, including the
Baltic states. Unfortunately, this option was not open to Russia.
An important conclusion we draw is that while much can be learned from the Russian crisis experience, to
understand the Russian crisis does not require a special methodology of analysis relative to other developing
country crises; in other words, the Russian crisis is extraordinary because of its size, not because of its
nature. In our opinion and experience, Russia is indeed a special country, because of its size, complexity,
and history; and yet Russia is not unique, nor do its citizens have a different system of economic
aspirations. Quite simply, the Russian crisis is a large-scale example of the systemic consequences of a
structure of perverse individual incentives built on an extremely weak legal environment. While lack of
experience, insider resistance, and external factors (the oil price drop, the Asian crisis) all played a role, the
insolvency of the Russian State and the deliberate hollowing of all other borrowers were the result of poor
incentives, which are both the cause and the self-reinforced result of the failure to establish financial and
contractual discipline in the country. Yet Russia is different in one respect: because of its political and
military importance, the scale of its financial crisis was made all the more dramatic by the scale of support
granted by international institutions to a government leading an unsustainable course of policy, which
encouraged capital flight and theft on an unique scale.
It is possible to propose a new reform strategy for Russia only after first having learnt from the mistakes of
the past. In a context where enforcement is weak or non credible, all economic agents come to expect
widespread noncompliance, which weakens any opportunity to supervise and enforce. In such cases, cynical
expectations become self-fulfilling. Any regulatory strategy which focuses on prudential regulation will fail
in the same circumstances as private contract enforcement. The sole remaining strategy is to identify market
structures and regulatory incentives which can affect individual incentives for banking solvency. As it has
been the case in Western countries at their early stage of financial development, crude restrictions, limited
entry and market segmentation are needed to control opportunistic behavior which can escape a more
liberal, rule-based regulatory policy.
These lessons for banking reform may therefore apply broadly to countries whose legal and governance
circumstances are comparable to Russia. The frequent failure of reform attempts has been in part the result24
of an excessive use of aggregate tools such as monetary stabilization and conventional bank supervisory
rules,  which fail to provide direct incentives and may be reversed by collective noncompliance behavior.
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Figure 1. Effective exchange rates (January 1997 = 100)
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Graph 1: Russian bubbles 
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Figure 2: Estimated capital flight from Russia
Source: elaboration on data from Russian Economic Trends, 2000
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Figure 3. Enterprise arrears as a percentage of GDP
Source: OECD
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Figure 4. Wage arrears
(December 1997 = 100)
Source: OECD
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Figure 5: Tax revenues and tax offsets
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Figure 6. The share of non-cash receipts for industrial firms
(Source: OECD)
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Figure 7. Commercial credit to the non-financial sector,
non-cash transactions and average returns on GKOs
(Source: OECD)
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Figure 8. Open foreign position and government bond holdings of
Russian commercial banks
Source: OECD
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Table I Number of bank licences withdrawn for violating
laws or CBR rules
I-96 27
II-96 114
III-96 64
IV-96 61
I-97 93
II-97 93
III-97 75
IV-97 58
I-98 60
II-98 42
III-98 69
IV-98 52
I-99 44
II-99 30
III-99 22
IV-99 30
I-00 14
II-00 6
III-00 11
IV-00 4
Total 96936
Figure 9 :  Bank deposits, in real term
(Source: Perotti and Sgard, 2000)
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Figure 10
Overall Average Institutional Quality (1997):
Deviation of national index from the average for Industrialized Countries
Source: Kaufmann et al. (1999b)
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Table 2
Russian banks with the largest forward contracts
on July 1, 1998  (R bn)
Forward
contracts
As % of assets
Inkombank 169.2 469.9
National Reserve 99.4 944.4
MDM-Bank 84.6 4656.8
Unibest 77.6 3709.2
Tokobank 66.9 871.7
ONEKSIM-bank 47.3 197.9
Sberbank 39.5 19.7
SBS-Agro 31.2 115.8
Avtobank 26.8 303.2
Gazprombank 25.7 189.5
Menatep 24.2 131.5
Vneshtorgbank 24.1 132.9
Mezhkombank 23.6 690.5
Rossiski Kredit 22.0 113.8
Metkombank 19.2 2000.0
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